Central African Republic: Elections, Security Volatility, and MINUSCA’s Future Amid Financial Strains

Prepared by African Security Analysis (ASA) based on UN Security Council briefings

Executive Summary

• Council in October: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s report by SRSG Valentine Rugwabiza (MINUSCA). Focus: electoral preparations, peace process, and security conditions.
• Elections: Presidential/parliamentary polls scheduled for 28 December; municipal elections also planned for the first time in nearly 40 years. Both face logistical, financial, and security hurdles.
• Security: Continued volatility—Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia abuses in the southeast; incursions along Sudanese border; armed groups partially recommitted to the peace process in N’Djamena.
• UN Operations: MINUSCA mandate renewal due in November; mission faces liquidity crisis, threats against peacekeepers, and political debate over possible transition planning.
• Council Dynamics: Differences sharpened by US funding cuts, accusations of mission alignment with Russia, and France’s penholder role.

Expected Council Action

In October, the Council will:

1. Receive a briefing and consultations on the latest MINUSCA report.

2. Assess electoral and security preparations for the 28 December polls.

3. Lay groundwork for the November mandate renewal of MINUSCA.

Political Developments and Elections

• Presidential Bid: On July 2025, President Faustin Archange Touadéra confirmed his candidacy for a third term, following the 2023 constitutional referendum removing term limits. Opposition and civil society have criticised the move as power consolidation and warned of shrinking political space.
• Parliamentary & Municipal Elections: National polls are paired with long-overdue local elections—first in nearly 40 years—supported logistically by MINUSCA.
• Electoral Environment: Attacks on civic space, restricted inclusivity, and financial shortfalls continue to constrain credibility.
• AU Engagement: On 19 September, the AUPSC urged greater international support, resource mobilisation, and private-sector investment to ensure credible elections.

Security Dynamics

• Militia Violence: The Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia continues targeted attacks on minority communities in the southeast, raising intercommunal tension.
• Regional Spillover: The Sudan conflict fuels instability along CAR’s northeast border, with increased incursions by armed groups.
• Armed Opposition Talks: In April, government envoys met in N’Djamena with opposition groups (3R, UPC). By July, Chad announced a peace agreement, recommitting groups to the 2019 APPR-RCA.

Humanitarian and Human Rights Situation

• Civilian Protection: Abuses persist across all actors; civilians, women, and children face ongoing threats.
• Peacekeepers Under Attack: Escalating attacks highlight urgent force protection needs (air mobility, ISR, enhanced intelligence).
• Justice Gap: The Special Criminal Court (SCC)—a hybrid mechanism—remains under-resourced, limiting accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Calls for donor mobilisation continue.

Key Issues and Options for the Council

1. Elections and Civic Space: Press CAR authorities to create inclusive conditions for December polls—protect civic space, enable women/youth participation, and ensure security guarantees.

2. Security Environment: Reinforce appeals to all armed groups to uphold APPR-RCA commitments; press non-signatories to disarm and join dialogue.

3. MINUSCA Mandate Renewal:

• Sustain electoral and security support amid UN liquidity crises.
• Consider options for mandate adaptation in November: enhanced force protection, structured support to SCC, or roadmap for post-2026 transition.

4. UN Personnel Safety: Council could adopt a statement on accountability for crimes against peacekeepers and demand host-state guarantees on operational freedom (fuel, logistics).

5. Financing Constraints: Discuss informal mechanisms or Peacebuilding Commission engagement to mobilise resources for elections and justice institutions.

Council Dynamics

• France: Penholder, strongly supportive of MINUSCA.
• Algeria (Amb. Bendjama): Chairs 2745 Sanctions Committee.
• US: Sharply critical cut $800m peacekeeping contributions (part of $5b rescission), citing corruption, SEA allegations, and alleged Russian influence in CAR.
• China: Advocates “transition mindset,” encouraging planning for mission drawdown by 2026—blocked earlier due to CAR government resistance.
• Russia: Maintains influence through bilateral ties, security contractors, and mining interests—controversial in Council debates.

Outlook (October–December 2025)

• Best-Case: Credible municipal and general elections supported by MINUSCA; reduced armed group activity; SCC funding mobilised; gradual consolidation of state authority.
• Baseline: Elections proceed amid sporadic violence, low inclusivity, and funding shortfalls; MINUSCA sustains core functions but constrained by liquidity.
• Risk Case: Escalation of militia and border violence; elections derailed or contested; MINUSCA restricted by host-state interference and Council divisions.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Recommendations

1. Guarantee Elections Security: Council should press for MINUSCA force protection upgrades (air assets, ISR, mobility).

2. Preserve Civic Space: Support parallel monitoring of inclusivity and electoral integrity; spotlight repression risks in Council debates.

3. Fund Justice Mechanisms: Mobilise targeted donor pledges for SCC operations; Council could encourage a joint pledging conference with AU/EU.

4. Safeguard Peacekeepers: Adopt strong language on accountability for attacks; ensure operational independence from restrictive fuel regulations.

5. Scenario Planning: Council should prepare transition options post-2026, contingent on conditions—not predetermined timelines.

Strategic Note

The Central African Republic faces a precarious balance: elections scheduled under fragile security, external pressure on MINUSCA’s resources, and contested legitimacy around the presidency. Standard reporting captures the events, but strategic foresight is required to anticipate how militia behaviour, Sudan’s spillover, and great-power competition will intersect to shape outcomes.

ASA can deliver such foresight. Through armed-group network mapping, political-economy diagnostics, and early-warning modelling, ASA equips governments, multilateral organisations, and investors with actionable intelligence. Our assessments go beyond describing challenges—they identify who, when, and how crises may pivot, and what options are viable for de-escalation or stabilisation.

While this forecast provides a high-level overview, ASA offers deeper confidential assessments, scenario analysis, and tailored options memos through costed engagements. Decision-makers requiring clarity, risk modelling, or discreet advisory should directly contact ASA. ASA remains available to ensure that the CAR’s trajectory towards elections and stability is guided by foresight rather than crisis reaction.