Central African Republic: Elections, Security, and MINUSCA’s Mandate Under Financial Strain

ASA Situation Assessment | November 2025 based on UNSC briefings

Overview and Expected UN Action

In November 2025, the UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), set to expire on 15 November. The CAR sanctions regime remains in force until 31 July 2026, and the Panel of Experts assisting the 2745 Sanctions Committee is mandated until 31 August 2026.

The renewal coincides with a critical electoral year for the CAR, where presidential, legislative, and local elections are scheduled for 28 December. Against a backdrop of fragile stability, financial deficits, and regional spillovers, the Council faces a complex balancing act — maintaining peacekeeping presence while addressing the UN’s liquidity crisis and growing calls for transition planning.

Political Landscape: Elections Amid Fragile Consensus

The Central African Republic’s political transition stands at a crossroads between fragility and consolidation.
At her 28 October briefing, Special Representative Valentine Rugwabiza underscored MINUSCA’s central role in civilian protection, electoral logistics, and support for the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (APPR-RCA).

However, the path to elections remains fraught:

• The opposition coalition BRDC (Bloc Républicain pour la Défense de la Constitution du 30 mars 2016) continues to boycott formal dialogue with the government, citing the shrinking civic space and exclusionary governance practices.
• Attempts by Prime Minister Félix Moloua to mediate an inclusive political framework in September yielded little progress, with dialogue stalled over procedural disputes.
• The government has committed an additional US$7.8 million toward elections, bringing the total to US$14.9 million, yet a $12.4 million gap remains — highlighting dependency on external assistance amid donor fatigue.

MINUSCA has deployed logistical convoys to deliver electoral materials to remote prefectures but continues to warn of security and infrastructure obstacles that could affect voter registration and ballot transport.

Security Dynamics: Local Gains, Border Instability, and Armed Group Reintegration

Security conditions in CAR remain asymmetrically volatile:

• Eastern and southeastern prefectures face recurrent attacks by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia, accused of atrocities, sexual violence, and forced displacement.
• In the northeast, cross-border incursions from Sudan’s Darfur conflict have destabilized border communities, compounding local grievances and stretching MINUSCA’s deployment capacity. The mission has reinforced temporary bases in affected zones but remains overstretched.

Conversely, stability has modestly improved in the northwest and centre, following April 2025 peace commitments by the armed groups 3R (Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation) and UPC (Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique) to rejoin the APPR-RCA and begin disarmament. The agreement, mediated by Chad, culminated in a July ceremony in Bangui marking the groups’ official return to the peace process.

MINUSCA continues to provide technical and security support for DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration) efforts, though funding shortages and fragmented command structures threaten sustainability.

Human Rights and Governance Challenges

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted Resolution 60/34 (8 October) reaffirming condemnation of all human rights and humanitarian law violations and urging full accountability.

Independent Expert Yao Agbetse, in his August report covering July 2024–June 2025, cited “mixed progress” in curbing violations. He acknowledged improvements linked to the APPR-RCA but highlighted persistent abuses by security forces and the limited reach of justice institutions.

Key concerns include:

• Arbitrary detentions and excessive use of force by the FACA (national armed forces).
• Continued impunity among foreign mercenary contingents and affiliated militias.
• Weak judicial capacity in the Special Criminal Court (SCC), which faces funding shortages and case backlogs.

Agbetse urged the government to reinvigorate implementation of peace accords and for MINUSCA to continue capacity-building support for governance and human rights institutions — a recommendation strongly echoed by the HRC.

Peacebuilding and Justice: The Role of the PBC and the SCC

On 3 October, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) convened to review the justice and rule-of-law sector, stressing the urgent need for funding for the Special Criminal Court (SCC) — a hybrid tribunal combining national and international judges, operational since 2018.

The SCC remains a critical but under-resourced pillar of CAR’s transitional justice architecture. Despite limited resources, it continues to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity, serving as a symbolic deterrent amid recurring violence.

The PBC also assessed outcomes from the Investment Roundtable for the CAR National Development Plan (2024–2028) held in Casablanca (14–15 September). The conference drew participation from President Faustin Archange Touadéra, multilateral lenders, and regional partners, but investors signalled conditional interest, citing security risks, corruption, and governance fragility.

UN Financial Strains and Mission Sustainability

MINUSCA operates under growing fiscal pressure. The UN’s liquidity crisis, with over $500 million in unpaid contributions, has forced a 15% expenditure reduction plan across missions.
This financial shortfall threatens:

• Logistics and air operations, particularly troop mobility in remote areas.
• Electoral support functions requiring sustained airlift capacity.
• DDR programs critical to maintaining recent peace dividends.

The Council will likely discuss whether to sustain current troop levels or begin a phased recalibration of mission posture. China and some African members have previously called for transition planning, suggesting MINUSCA prepare for an eventual drawdown by 2026, contingent on political stability.

However, both France (penholder) and Algeria (chair of the 2745 Committee) support maintaining robust deployment through the elections.

Council Dynamics and External Friction

Council discussions remain influenced by divergent geopolitical and financial priorities:

• The United States has reduced funding to UN peacekeeping, citing inefficiency and “alignment with Russian interests” — an implicit critique of Bangui’s close cooperation with Moscow.
• Russia continues to expand its security footprint through bilateral defence cooperation and private military actors, focusing on protecting strategic mining zones.
• China advocates for a gradual transition strategy and greater African ownership of security responsibilities.
• France, despite waning influence, remains the principal diplomatic lead on CAR within the Council.

Despite these fractures, last year’s unanimous renewal of MINUSCA’s mandate — the first in four years — reflected cautious consensus on the mission’s stabilizing role. Yet, this year’s budget crisis and election timing could reopen debates over the mission’s size, priorities, and longevity.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Assessment

The Central African Republic stands at a pivotal juncture: the December 2025 elections will serve as both a test of national cohesion and a barometer of MINUSCA’s effectiveness under financial duress.
While the peace process has delivered limited local stability, CAR remains highly vulnerable to external shocks — from Sudan’s conflict spillover to foreign military influence and electoral fragmentation.

ASA assesses that:

• The elections will proceed but with high logistical and security risks, particularly in border prefectures.
• DDR and reintegration efforts could lose momentum without sustained funding.
• The liquidity crisis poses the single most immediate operational threat to MINUSCA’s mandate.
• Political rhetoric around foreign alignment (Russia vs. France) risks polarizing donor support and constraining diplomatic flexibility.

Outlook (Q1 2026)

• Short-term: MINUSCA mandate renewed for 12 months, with increased scrutiny on spending and troop efficiency.
• Medium-term: Risk of post-election instability if opposition boycotts results; possibility of localized militia resurgence.
• Long-term: Without a credible transition plan and economic stabilization, the CAR risks recycling conflict dynamics under an overstretched peacekeeping framework.

ASA Conclusion:

The Central African Republic enters its election season under the shadow of constrained resources and external competition. MINUSCA’s mandate renewal may ensure continuity but cannot mask the systemic fragility of a state still dependent on international scaffolding.
Absent structural reforms, fiscal sustainability, and inclusive governance, Bangui’s stability will remain transactional — maintained by external forces but not owned from within.