CAR-UN Security Council Sanctions Regime “2745” – Renewal Vote

Strategic Briefing by ASA based on the UNSCR Briefing

Executive Overview

On 29 July 2025 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is expected to adopt, by unanimous vote, a draft resolution that prolongs all sanctions targeting armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) until 31 July 2026 and extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts that monitors these measures until 31 August 2026. The text, proposed by France after consultation with Bangui, makes no substantive changes to last year’s Resolution 2745, which lifted the government-level arms embargo while tightening restrictions on non-state actors. Passage is virtually certain after the draft survived the Council’s silence procedure on 21 July.

How the Situation Evolved

Resolution 2745, adopted on 30 July 2024, marked the first unanimous Council decision on the CAR file in four years. It removed the long-standing embargo on official arms imports yet preserved travel bans, asset freezes and weapon prohibitions for rebel groups. In December 2024 and May 2025, the Panel of Experts filed two detailed reports, later reviewed by the 2745 Sanctions Committee on 11 June.

The reports portray a conflict entering a new phase. Government forces have widened their footprint across western prefectures, eroding rebel taxation of gold and diamond pits. Inside the main rebel coalition—the Coalition des Patriotes pour le Changement (CPC)—factional splits are accelerating. Eastern militias, meanwhile, have begun leasing fighters across the border to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), exchanging manpower for cash and weapons.

At the same time, the panel recorded grave human-rights violations by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) militia, now partly integrated into the national armed forces (FACA). Kimberley Process restrictions on diamond exports were formally lifted in November 2024, yet auditors still flag weak traceability and a persistent risk that conflict stones enter legal supply chains.

Security Council Dynamics

France, as penholder, elected a “technical rollover” of one year. The Central African government endorsed the plan, easing negotiations. Russia—having secured the 2024 lifting of the state arms embargo—raised no objections. The United States and United Kingdom continue to link future adjustments to measurable improvements in human-rights compliance, especially regarding state-aligned militias. Algeria, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, the Council’s African members, support maintaining pressure on armed groups while allowing Bangui to equip its forces.

Anticipated Field Impact (July 2025–July 2026)

The extension stabilises international policy but leaves core conflict drivers intact. Rebel groups, squeezed financially, may turn to opportunistic banditry or headline-grabbing attacks to maintain relevance—particularly as CAR prepares local, legislative and presidential elections for late 2025. The mercenary pipeline through Vakaga prefecture could mature into a permanent cross-border economy if fighting in Sudan drags on.

Resource-sector actors face heightened scrutiny. Diamonds legally exported under Kimberley certification still require robust chain-of-custody technology—bar-coded bags, blockchain ledgers, or equivalent—if companies hope to satisfy OECD due-diligence audits. Banks will keep CAR transactions in high-risk compliance tiers, tightening know-your-customer protocols and occasionally severing correspondent relationships. Humanitarian agencies should expect insurance premiums to remain elevated; underwriters cite an “unchanged threat landscape”.

Independent Recommendations

• Mining and Trading Companies – Move from paper-based to fully digital traceability systems before the anticipated Q4 export surge. Engage third-party auditors to stress-test supply-chain data and publish summary findings to reassure downstream buyers.
• Financial Institutions – Update sanctions-screening lists immediately after the UNSC vote. Implement enhanced due-
• diligence reviews for counterparties operating in Vakaga, Haute-Kotto and Mbomou prefectures, where the risk of rebel or mercenary infiltration is highest.
• Humanitarian and Development Agencies – Pre-position contingency stocks in Berbérati and Bambari. Draw up evacuation and hibernation protocols for national staff in Bangui, where election-related unrest is most likely.
• Private-Sector Security Managers – Conduct fresh route assessments on corridors linking mining sites to the Cameroonian port of Douala and to Bangui’s M’Poko Airport. Pay special attention to stretches that parallel Sudanese smuggling tracks; armed escorts or community liaison teams may be required.
• Government of the Central African Republic and Its Partners – Accelerate biometric border-control upgrades along the Sudan, Chad and Democratic Republic of Congo frontiers. Vet militia affiliates rigorously before formal FACA integration, excluding anyone credibly implicated in abuses to avoid future sanctions exposure.
• Investors and Political-Risk Analysts – Scenario-plan for three paths:

Baseline (60 %) – Elections proceed with sporadic violence; sanctions remain for the full year.

Deterioration (30 %) – Sudan spill-over intensifies, driving a resurgence of rebel activity in Vakaga.

Improvement (10 %) – Meaningful ceasefire talks with CPC moderates reduce incidents and open space for gradual sanctions easing in 2026.

Stakeholders should align capital deployment and aid-delivery timetables with these probability bands, adjusting for updates after the vote and as MINUSCA issues its pre-election security briefings.