Attempted Coup d’État and Aftermath in Benin

Monthly Summary (December 2025)

Executive Summary

On 7 December 2025, elements within Benin’s armed forces launched a coordinated attempt to destabilise the government in Cotonou, including attacks on senior military residences, a temporary seizure of the state broadcaster SRTB, and efforts to access the Presidential Palace. Government-loyal forces rapidly contained the operation through checkpoints and movement restrictions, including reported bridge closures between Cotonou and Porto-Novo. The coup attempt was publicly claimed by Lt Col Pascal Tigri and the self-declared Comité Militaire pour la Refondation (CMR), citing grievances linked to insecurity in northern Benin, perceived institutional neglect of soldiers, and broader political and socio-economic discontent.

The crisis prompted swift external engagement, including ECOWAS commitments to deploy the Standby Force and reporting of French special operations support, while Benin reportedly requested Nigerian air support and French intelligence assistance. Authorities arrested 31 individuals, mostly military personnel, and detained prominent opposition figures, raising political sensitivities ahead of the 12 April 2026 Presidential election. Disinformation spread widely online, complicating official crisis messaging and reinforcing concerns around coordinated information manipulation. Regionally, diplomatic relations between Benin and Niger collapsed on 01 January 2026, further straining cross-border coordination at a time of rising extremist violence and wider regional fragmentation. Overall, the incident underscored Benin’s mounting internal security pressures, potential fractures within the security forces, and heightened political risks entering the 2026 electoral period.

In the early hours of 7 December 2025, reports of gunfire emerged across Cotonou, signalling a coordinated effort by elements within the armed forces to undermine the constitutional order. The assailants reportedly targeted the residences of senior military leaders, briefly took two senior soldiers hostage, attempted to gain access to the Presidential Palace, and temporarily seized control of the state broadcaster SRTB. As events unfolded, government-loyal forces rapidly established roadblocks and military checkpoints across the city. Multiple reports also indicated that bridges linking Cotonou to Porto-Novo were blocked, likely as a containment measure intended to restrict movement and prevent further escalation.

By later that same day, ECOWAS publicly announced its intention to deploy the Standby Force to Benin, drawing contingents from Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. Parallel reporting suggested the arrival of French special operations personnel, deployed from Abidjan to Cotonou, reportedly to support immediate stabilisation efforts. In the days that followed, public mobilisation remained limited. However, on 13 December, a notable crowd gathered at Place Bulgarie in Cotonou to denounce the coup attempt and express support for constitutional rule. Estimates placed participation between 1,000 and 5,000, with attendees described primarily as youth and reportedly representing a range of political affiliations. Beyond this event, no further significant protests or coup-related unrest have been reported.

Actors Behind the Coup Attempt

The attempted seizure of power was publicly claimed on state television through a looped broadcast showing armed men in military fatigues led by Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri, who identified themselves as the Comité Militaire pour la Refondation (CMR). The group declared that President Patrice Talon had been overthrown, the government dissolved, and the constitution suspended. Their stated justification focused on frustrations over the deteriorating security environment in northern Benin, coupled with claims of institutional neglect toward soldiers killed in service and grievances related to perceived inequities in promotion practices. The message also expanded into broader political and socio-economic themes, citing alleged shortcomings in the education sector, dissatisfaction with economic conditions, and perceptions that wealth and opportunity are concentrated among a narrow elite. The CMR further highlighted concerns over political exclusion, arrests, and intimidation of opponents, presenting these factors as key drivers of national instability.

Lt Col Tigri reportedly fled Benin during the course of 7 December, though accounts of his destination remain contradictory and unverified, with some suggesting Togo, others Burkina Faso or Niger. At the time of reporting, Tigri remains at large.

External Support and Security Intervention

Operationally, the coup attempt showed early signs of failure as loyalist forces mounted counter-operations with apparent speed and effectiveness. Reporting indicates that many dissenting elements consolidated around the Togbin military base in Cotonou, where they were subsequently contained. To prevent further escalation and reinforce counter-operations, the Talon administration reportedly sought support from regional and international partners. Benin is assessed to have requested air support from Nigeria and received intelligence and surveillance assistance from France, reflecting an immediate reliance on established bilateral security relationships.

Nigerian involvement reportedly included air operations targeting the Togbin base. Beninese authorities later framed this request as necessary to ensure control of national airspace and to enable precision action in or near densely populated areas. While ECOWAS initially communicated a broader deployment plan, reporting indicates that approximately 200–250 ECOWAS troops are currently present in Benin, largely drawn from Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. However, key details remain unclear, including the formal mandate, geographic scope of operations, rules of engagement, and the expected duration of the deployment. It is also not confirmed whether these forces will contribute to securing the upcoming electoral process.

Benin’s request for support is consistent with established frameworks, given its bilateral partnerships and its ECOWAS membership, which enables military assistance during periods of crisis. Notably, there has been limited evidence of sustained public backlash against the external support provided during and after the coup attempt.

Post-Coup Arrests, Political Sensitivities, and Information Environment

In the aftermath, authorities reportedly arrested 31 individuals, the majority of whom are members of the armed forces. Many are being prosecuted on charges including treason, murder, and attacks on state security, while Lt Col Tigri remains a key wanted suspect. The arrest of high-profile political figures has further heightened sensitivities around the government’s handling of opposition actors. Among those detained is former defence minister Candide Azannaï, a prominent critic of President Talon, who was formally remanded in custody on 19 December and faces allegations linked to participation in the plot, including “conspiracy against state authority” and “direct incitement to rebellion.” Opposition parliamentarian Sounon Bouke of Les Démocrates (LD) has also been arrested, reportedly for “encouraging crimes against state security” and “incitement to rebellion.”

These detentions are likely to be interpreted domestically through the lens of previous opposition arrests and political restrictions, potentially amplifying polarisation ahead of the Presidential election scheduled for 12 April 2026. While large-scale unrest has not followed the coup attempt, the combination of elite arrests and approaching elections is assessed to carry an elevated risk of hostile rhetoric, heightened mistrust, and sharper contestation across political lines.

The information space following the attempted coup has also been heavily contested. Online narratives circulated widely, including claims that crowds were celebrating in the streets and expressing joy at the alleged collapse of the government. These images and narratives were not reflected in observable conditions on the ground, reinforcing the assessment that disinformation and coordinated information manipulation remain significant challenges in Benin and the wider region. Such information “noise” complicates crisis management by limiting the reach of official messaging and increasing the potential for fear, confusion, and distrust among communities during periods of instability.

Regional Fallout: Benin–Niger Diplomatic Breakdown

On 1 January 2026, Benin and Niger issued mutual persona non grata declarations against each other’s diplomatic representations, effectively terminating diplomatic relations that had only recently been restored following the July 2023 coup in Niger. This rupture follows persistent, unconfirmed allegations suggesting Nigerien support for the coup attempt, alongside counter-allegations from Niger that Benin may be using the coup narrative as a pretext for hostile actions. Regardless of attribution, the diplomatic breakdown adds a further layer of strain to already fragile regional coordination.

Outlook and Significance

The coup attempt has reinforced the extent of Benin’s internal security pressures, particularly in the context of expanding extremist violence that has largely affected the north but is increasingly impacting the east as well. Beyond the immediate threat environment, the incident has exposed potential fractures within the security forces, raising concerns regarding institutional cohesion and discipline at a time when operational effectiveness is critical.

The grievances referenced by the putschists—including economic inequality, perceptions of political exclusion, and claims of intimidation—are likely to remain salient. With the 12 April 2026 Presidential election expected to feature only two candidates, and with reports that the main opposition party has been barred from participation, underlying political tensions may persist beyond the election period, particularly if perceptions grow that the electoral process lacks competitiveness or fairness.

The events of 7 December also highlighted the operational value of Benin’s current regional partnerships. Strong relations with ECOWAS and key partners enabled a rapid external response and reinforced government control. However, the crisis has unfolded against a broader backdrop of deepening regional fragmentation, particularly rising hostility between ECOWAS member states and the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) bloc. Persistent narratives regarding potential intervention against AES members continue to shape regional posturing and may fuel suspicion, retaliation, or proxy pressures along border areas.

Finally, the collapse of Benin–Niger diplomatic relations is assessed to further complicate cross-border security cooperation at a time when joint coordination is essential to counter violent extremism and transnational armed activity.