When
Location
Topic
1 jan. 1970 01:00
Benin, Gabon, Rwanda, Somaliland, Egypt, Zambia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, Djibouti, West Sahara, São Tomé and Príncipe, Madagascar, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria, Gambia, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Uganda, Mauritius, Sudan, Niger, Somalia, Malawi, Libya, Comoros, Angola, Lesotho, Mali, Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, DRC, Eswatini
Economic Development, Natural Resources, Development projects, International aid, Mining, Oil
Stamp

Africa’s Marginalization in U.S. Foreign Policy

A recent panel discussion moderated by Johnny Gas (Invest Africa) has laid bare a sobering reality: despite extensive partnership rhetoric, Africa remains a low priority in the second administration of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

A Modest Slice of U.S. Trade and Selective Engagement

Analysts note that Africa accounts for only about 1% of total U.S. trade. Moreover, within that small share, U.S. engagement is heavily skewed toward a handful of countries endowed with critical mineral reserves. Aubry Ruby of the Atlantic Council commented, “Africa is not at the top of the agenda, but certain regions are becoming geopolitically vital.” Likewise, Cameron Hudson from CSIS observed that this selective approach creates a stark division between “target states” and “forgotten nations,” marginalizing many African countries—especially those outside mineral corridors or conflict zones. For example, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is now a priority because of its cobalt reserves, nations such as Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone are witnessing drastically reduced U.S. engagement.

Domestic Politics Over Global Development

Judy Moore from the Centre for Global Development argued that current U.S. diplomacy is driven more by domestic political considerations than by a genuine commitment to global development. “Investment decisions, partnerships, or sanctions are increasingly reactive to the U.S. internal political landscape,” she noted. This shift has already affected initiatives like Power Africa and a few USAID-funded educational programs, highlighting the fragility of U.S.-Africa development cooperation.

Economic Pressures and the Impact of New Tariffs

Panellists expressed deep concern over new U.S. tariffs and regulatory barriers that are adversely affecting African exports. Since January 2025, textile products from countries including Lesotho, Madagascar, and Ethiopia have been subject to tariffs ranging from 12% to 20%—a significant reversal from the gains achieved under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). In Lesotho alone, over 12,000 jobs have been lost in the garment sector, impacting nearly 40% of its industrial workforce. Between January and April 2025, textile exports from Sub-Saharan Africa to the U.S. declined by 38%, resulting in losses exceeding $480 million. Additionally, agricultural exports have been hit Kenya’s tropical flower exports dropped by 22% due to unexpectedly stringent phytosanitary requirements, with similar setbacks noted in Uganda and Tanzania’s coffee sectors. These non-tariff barriers are widely viewed as indirect trade restrictions that contravene World Trade Organization norms.

Shifts in U.S. Development Finance

The restructuring of USAID—marked by a 28% budget cut for Africa in 2025 and the closure of over 40 regional offices—coupled with the rise of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), signals a radical shift in the U.S. model for development finance on the continent. The DFC is expanding its footprint but with much stricter investment thresholds. It now prioritizes deals over $150 million and demands commercial grade guarantees that many African governments find unattainable. To date, only South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, and Senegal have secured over 80% of the DFC funding approved as of May 2025, whereas nations like Angola, Mozambique, and even the DRC are being sidelined due to what is termed a lack of “project maturity.” Increasingly, DFC funds are directed toward projects tied to U.S. national security priorities—such as critical infrastructure projects that secure access to strategic mineral resources via ports and railways.

A Securitized Diplomatic Approach

Strategically, the Trump administration has concentrated its focus on three core areas: Counterterrorism in Somalia and the Sahel, control over resource-rich corridors (as seen in the DRC and the Zambia mineral corridor), and maritime security in the Red Sea. A recent $2.1 billion infrastructure deal in the DRC—backed by the U.S, Canada, and Japan—serves as a blueprint for what has been termed “securitized mineral diplomacy.” This deal, which includes the modernization of the Lobito Corridor rail line leading to Angola’s coast, aims to safeguard resource flows and counter China’s growing influence. In return, the U.S. demands political alignment from its partners, particularly in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. As Cameron Hudson observed, this new approach “blends business, foreign policy, and security in ways we’ve never seen before.” The deepening U.S. military involvement in Somalia—marked by a reduction in diplomatic presence in favour of enhanced drone operations and support to local militias—further illustrates this strategy, although it risks destabilizing already fragile states and raises significant concerns over national sovereignty.

Analysis from Africa Security Analysis

In this rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape, Africa Security Analysis finds that the current U.S. approach is creating unequal engagement across the continent. From an economic perspective, analysts point out that the narrow focus on resource-rich regions severely limits broader development, leaving many African nations to fend for themselves in an increasingly competitive global arena. The panel’s analysis suggests that the selective U.S. engagement, compounded by new tariffs and bureaucratic hurdles from development agencies, effectively marginalizes countries that do not fit the U.S. strategic mold. Furthermore, Africa Security Analysis observes that U.S. development finance is being restructured to favour projects that align with national security interests rather than comprehensive developmental needs. This shift is evident in the DFC’s stringent funding criteria that favour a select few over the vast potential of other African nations. The overall analysis underscores the risk that, without a recalibrated U.S.-Africa trade framework, African countries may be forced into unfavourable bilateral arrangements that further erode their collective bargaining power on the global stage.

Conclusion

The panel’s verdict is clear: Africa is not receiving the comprehensive attention that its potential and needs warrant. The current U.S. approach—driven primarily by domestic political imperatives and a narrow focus on strategic resources—underscores a growing disparity in how African nations are valued on the global stage. As Africa Security Analysis notes, this imbalance has far-reaching implications for trade, development finance, and diplomatic engagement. The growing marginalization and the selective nature of U.S. policy are reshaping the continent’s economic and strategic landscape, leaving many nations to navigate a complex and often hostile external environment.

Share this article
ASA Logo

ASA Situation Reports™

ASA Logo

Discover More

Benin, Gabon, Rwanda, Somaliland, Egypt, Zambia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Kenya, Namibia, Djibouti, West Sahara, São Tomé and Príncipe, Madagascar, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria, Gambia, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Uganda, Mauritius, Sudan, Niger, Somalia, Malawi, Libya, Comoros, Angola, Lesotho, Mali, Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, DRC, Eswatini 1 jan. 1970 01:00

Africa’s Marginalization in U.S. Foreign Policy

A recent panel discussion moderated by Johnny Gas (Invest Africa) has laid bare a sobering reality: despite extensive partnership rhetoric, Africa remains a low priority in the second administration of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger 18 juni 2025 09:43

Assessing the Improbability of Jihadist Takeovers in Sahelian Capitals – An Africa Security Analysis Perspective

In recent months, the Sahel has seen a sharp escalation in jihadist activity. Major strikes targeting military outposts and civilian areas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have claimed hundreds of lives and displaced tens of thousands.

Request for interest

Contact us to find out how our security services can support you.

We operate in almost all countries in Africa, including high-risk environments, monitoring and analyze ongoing conflicts, the hotspots and the potential upcoming threats on the continent. Every day. Around the clock.